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Constitutional Law- Grigsby v. Mabry: Are Death-Qualified
Juries No Longer Qualified to Assess Guilt?
Until 1968 a state could "death-qualify" a jury sitting on a capital case by
challenging for cause any juror who objected to capital punishment.' In
Witherspoon v. Illinois2 the United States Supreme Court substantially cur-
tailed a state's ability to remove a juror who morally opposed infliction of the
death penalty. The Court found that exclusion of all jurors with scruples
against capital punishment destroyed the jury's impartiality on the question of
sentencing, "produc[ing] a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to
die. ' 3 Such a hanging-jury violated due process, requiring that the resulting
death sentence be set aside. The Court in Witherspoon mandated that mildly
scrupled jurors-those opposed to capital punishment but nonetheless able to
put aside their personal beliefs and vote for the death sentence in the appropri-
ate case--could not be excluded for cause from any phase of the trial.4 The
decision did not require that those more highly scrupled jurors who, although
able to impartially assess guilt, would never vote to impose capital punishment
be allowed to serve during either the guilt or sentence determination phases of
the trial.5 Nor was the Court willing to find that a "death-qualified" jury was
impermissibly partial on the issue of guilt.6 In a partial concurrence Justice
Douglas voiced a strong objection to these later aspects of the holding,7 an
1. See Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
2. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
3. Id. at 521.
4. Id. at 521-23.
5. Id. at 522-23, n.21. The Court stressed that the decision did not bear
upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from
which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made
unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatical, vote against the imposition of capi-
tal punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at trial of the
case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.
Id. Although this can be read as a statement by the Court that it was not deciding the constitu-
tionality of challenging highly scrupled jurors, a more recent pronouncement by the Court indi-
cates that jurors may be challenged if they are "so irrevocably opposed to capital punishment as to
frustrate the State's legitimate efforts to administer its constitutionally valid death penalty
scheme." Adams v. Texas, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2529 (1980).
It has also been suggested that, as a practical matter, the two groups excluded under Wither-
spoon, those who would automatically vote against the death penalty and those biased against the
prosecution on the issue of guilt, are the same people. Supplemental Brief Amicus Curiae of the
North Carolina Civil Liberties Union at 10-I1, Crawford v. Bounds, 395 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.),
vacated, 393 U.S. 76 (1968). If this is true then Grigsby's claim concerning the representative
nature of a death-qualified jury (see text accompanying notes 14-15 infra) is purely academic.
6. 391 U.S. at 518. This aspect of the holding was based on the Court's skepticism about the
reliability of several studies which Witherspoon had offered as proof of the partiality of death-
qualified juries on the issue of guilt. The Court left open the possibility that future studies would
change this result. Id. at 520, n.18.
7. Id. at 523 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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attack that recently has been renewed by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas. In Grigsby v. Mabr 8 that court argued that
eliminating those highly scrupled jurors who are able to assess guilt fairly
from the guilt determination phase of the trial violates defendant's sixth
amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section
of the community. 9 Nonetheless, the court felt constrained by stare decisis to
reject defendant's claim that his right to a jury drawn from a cross-section of
the community had been violated' ° but remanded for further hearings on de-
fendant's claim that a death-qualified jury is per se partial on the issue of
guilt."' Chief Judge Eisele's analysis of the cross-section claim has thrown
considerable doubt on the continued validity of this aspect of Witherspoon in
light of subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements. Grigsby reflects the
growing concern over the soundness of Witherspoon,12 a concern which must
eventually be answered by the Supreme Court.
In Grigsby the state charged defendant James Grigsby with committing
felony murder, a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment. Under Ar-
kansas practice the jury that makes the determination of guilt must also deter-
mine the appropriate sentence in a separate phase of the trial. 13 Prior to trial
Grigsby requested that two panels be used and that those highly scrupled ju-
8. 483 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
9. Id. at 1376-84. The sixth amendment provides that the "accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
The requirement that a jury be chosen from a cross-section of the community has its origins
in the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879), the Court held that a jury selection process that excluded blacks violated a black defend-
ant's right to equal protection. In a later application of this principle the Court stated that it is
"part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury
be a body truly representative of the community." Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). In
reviewing a federal conviction the Court stated in dictum that the cross-section requirement was
part of the "traditional requirements of jury trial" embodied in the sixth amendment. Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). To bring a jury challenge under the cross-section require-
ment a defendant did not need to demonstrate that any prejudice had resulted from the exclusion
of an identifiable group in the community. However, until the Court held in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), that the sixth amendment was applicable to the states, it insisted that the
defendant in a state court proceeding be a member of the excluded group, and in cases of exclu-
sion of non-racial groups, that the defendant demonstrate prejudice. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
261, 287 (1947). Justice Murphy dissented in Fay, arguing that "[w]e can never measure accu-
rately the prejudice that results from the exclusion of certain types of qualified people from a jury
panel. Such prejudice is so subtle, so intangible, that it escapes the ordinary methods of proof."
Id. at 300 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall gave this argument authority by using it to
find that the exclusion of black jurors from a white defendant's trial violated due process. Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
10. 483 F. Supp. at 1385.
11. Id. at 1389.
12. See, e.g., Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
13. 483 F. Supp. at 1375, n.2. The court noted that if
Arkansas followed the federal practice in which the judge fixes the sentence after a jury
verdict of guilt, or, if Arkansas required a separate "sentencing" jury, the problem would
not arise because it would obviously be improper to excuse a jurorfor cause (in the guilt-
determination-trial) solely upon the basis of his irrevocable opposition to the death pen-
alty. But see Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) which suggests to
the contrary.
Id. See the discussion of Spinkellink in text accompanying notes 54-61 infra.
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rors who believed that they could be impartial on the question of guilt not be
removed for cause from that phase of the trial. Grigsby also requested a con-
tinuance to present evidence in support of his claim that a death-qualified
jury, even under the Witherspoon limitation, is conviction prone in that it is
more likely to convict than a jury that has not been rid of scrupled jurors.
Both requests were denied. Over Grigsby's objection three of the veniremen
were excused because they were irrevocably opposed to the death penalty, and
the jury chosen from among the remaining veniremen found Grigsby guilty.
Grigsby received a sentence of life imprisonment after the prosecution waived
the death penalty. He unsuccessfully appealed to the Arkansas Supreme
Court 14 and then petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The
court rejected defendant's claim that his jury was not drawn from a cross-
section of the community but remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on
his claim that the jury was conviction prone and therefore violated his right to
an impartial jury.
Grigsby's claim that highly scrupled jurors should be allowed to sit dur-
ing the guilt determinationi phase of trial was based on two requirements of the
sixth amendment: that a jury be drawn from a cross-section of the community
and that it be impartial.' 5 In Taylor v. Louisiana16 the Court held that the
"selection of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community
is an essential component of the sixth amendment right to a jury trial."17 Fur-
ther, the Taylor Court implied that a defendant was not required to show that
any specific prejudice had resulted from the lack of representativeness because
unrepresentativeness in and of itself "deprived him of the kind of factfinder to
which he was constitutionally entitled."' 18 In Duren v. Missouri19 the Supreme
Court specified the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of viola-
tion of the cross-section requirement:
The defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be ex-
cluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the repre-
sentation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not
14. Grigsby v. State, 260 Ark. 499, 542 S.W.2d. 275 (1976).
15. See note 9 supra.
16. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
17. Id. at 528.
18. Id. at 526. This was the interpretation given to the Taylor decision by the court in Grig-
sby. 483 F. Supp. at 1377. The Taylor decision made it clear that the issue was the substantial
underrepresentation of a cognizable group in the community; there is no requirement that juries
"must mirror the community and reflect the various distinct groups in the population." 419 U.S.
at 538. In Taylor the excluded group was women, a group formed to be cognizable in a previous
case decided on statutory grounds. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In finding
cognizability the Ballard Court reasoned that the
truth is that the two sexes are not fungible. . . the subtle interplay of influence one on
the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in
a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either is
excluded.
.d. at 193-94 (footnote omitted). The Court also advanced another rationale for not requiring a
demonstration of actual prejudice in stating that "the injury is not limited to the defendant--there
is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the
democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts." Id. at 195.
19. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to system-
atic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 20
In Grigsby defendant claimed that removal for cause of jurors absolutely
opposed to the death penalty violated the principles established in Taylor and
Duren. Because the Supreme Court had not yet formulated these principles
when it decided Witherspoon, the Grigsby court was confronted with the ques-
tion of whether a post-Taylor Supreme Court would have decided Wither-
spoon differently. While the Supreme Court was aware when deciding
Witherspoon that the exclusion of mildly scrupled jurors would produce a jury
that did not reflect the makeup of the community,21 the majority chose to
ignore the issue of whether this exclusion violated the cross-section require-
ment. Rather, it merely stated that "we cannot conclude, either on the basis of
the record now before us or as a matter ofjudicial notice, that the exclusion of
jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the
issue of guilt or substantially increases the risk of conviction."'22 This state-
ment, as the court in Grigsby noted, demonstrates "the conflict in analysis that
permeates Witherspoon. *23 Did the Court mean that it was unwilling to recog-
nize scrupled jurors as an identifiable group in the community, or did it hold
that there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that a death-qualified
jury was conviction-prone, and thereby lacking impartiality?24 Or was the de-
cision based on rejecting both claims? The Grigsby court was troubled by the
lack of analysis in Witherspoon of the implications of exclusion of scrupled
jurors under the cross-section requirement and decided to re-examine the issue
in light of Taylor and Duren.
The Grigsby court examined whether defendant had established a prima
facie case of violation of the cross-section requirement according to the test set
forth in Duren. The first element defendant had to establish was that highly
20. Id. at 364.
21. In light of Douglas' concurring opinion it is impossible to conclude that the majority was
unaware of the cross-section argument. Douglas thought that the majority had disregarded the
principles of the cross-section requirement in allowing highly scrupled jurors to be excluded.
Douglas could
see no constitutional basis for excluding those who are so opposed to capital punishment
that they would never inflict it on a defendant. Exclusion of them means the selection of
jurors who are either protagonists of the death penalty or are neutral concerning it. That
results in a systematic exclusion of qualified groups, and the deprivation to the accused
of a cross-section of the community for decision on both his guilt and his punishment.
391 U.S. at 528 (Douglas, J., concurring). The majority in Witherspoon refused to go this far, but
never articulated a response to Douglas' argument.
22. Id. at 517-18.
23. 483 F. Supp. at 1379.
24. By rejecting the claim that the jury was conviction-prone and the claim that it was unrep-
resentative in the same breath, the Court seemed to be treating two distinct constitutional require-
ments as one. There is no need to demonstrate prejudice to sustain a challenge under the cross-
section requirement. See note 9 supra. The implication of the Tayor decision was not a novel
one, but it had never been applied to a challenge of a state selection system, except on racial
grounds. A proper analysis of the factors to be considered in deciding a challenge under the cross-
section requirement--cognizability of the excluded group, degree of underrepresentation, the
cause of the underrepresentation, and the state's interests-was not done by the Witherspoon
Court, so Witherspoon serves as ambiguous precedent on the cross-section claim in Grigsby.
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scrupled jurors are a distinctive group in the community.25 The court was
aware that the recognition given to scrupled jurors as a distinctive class by the
Supreme Court in Witherspoon was not dispositive of the question because not
all scrupled jurors had been excluded from Grigsby's trial, as they had been in
Witherspoon, but only those who would never vote for capital punishment.26
The Witherspoon decision only recognized mildly scrupled jurors as being a
necessary component of an impartial jury on the sentencing phase of the trial,
so it is possible that the cognizability of scrupled jurors under the cross-section
requirement was never decided in Witherspoon.27 To determine if the sub-
group of highly scrupled jurors constituted an identifiable group as required
by Duren the court adopted the test enunciated in United States v. Olson.
28
Under Olson the excluded group will be considered cognizable only if, in their
absence, no other group on the jury will represent their views. 29
Applying the Olson test the court found that it "cannot be doubted that
by that standard those excluded for cause pursuant to Witherspoon constitute
an identifiable group. No one else will represent their strong viewpoint on the
jury in their absence." 30 However, the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's
treatment of the question in Witherspoon prevented the court from assuming
that the Supreme Court would reach the same result if confronted with the
question today. While the decision in Witherspoon differentiated between
mildly and highly scrupled jurors, it is not clear how this distinction was to be
viewed. The Grigsby court considered the possibility that "the Supreme Court
was saying there is an important difference in the two groups when it comes to
sentencing but not in relation to guilt determination.' '31 In other words,
25. 439 U.S. at 364.
26. 483 F. Supp. at 1380.
27. Justice Douglas was prepared to hold that both mildly and highly scrupled jurors were
cognizable during all stages of the trial. See note 21 supra.
28. 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973). The language quoted by the
court in Grigsby, 483 F. Supp. at 1382, arguably does not set out a complete test of cognizability,
but examines only one factor. A more comprehensive test of cognizability was presented in
United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Under Guzman a group
must have a definite composition. That is, there must be some factor which defines and
limits the group. A cognizable group is not one whose membership shifts from day to
day or whose members can be arbitrarily selected. Secondly, the group must have cohe-
sion. There must be a common thread which runs through the group, a basic similarity
in attitudes or ideas or experience which is present in members of the group and which
cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury selection pro-
cess. Finally, there must be a possibility that the exclusion of the group will result in
partiality or bias on the part of juries hearing cases in which group members are in-
volved.
id. at 143-44. This test identifies one factor not explored in Grigsby, the ability to define the
group. Grigsby may not have dealt with this because highly scrupled jurors are self-defining, in
fact "the United States Supreme Court itself has drawn the line to create the two, assumedly
diferent groups: those with mild scruples who may not be excused for cause and those who will
never impose the death penalty .... 483 F. Supp. at 1382. Because of this, only the second
factor, the possibility that the views of the group will go unrepresented, is important. The third
factor identified by Guzman, the possibility of bias, is clearly unimportant under Taylor. See note
18 supra.
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Witherspoon could be interpreted as holding that highly scrupled jurors are a
cognizable group during the sentencing phase but not during the guilt determi-
nation phase of the trial. An alternative interpretation of the holding in
Witherspoon is that it stood only for the proposition that a death-qualified jury
was not impartial on the issue of sentencing and did not address the issue or
cognizability under the cross-section requirement at all. This position was not
adopted by the court in Grigsby, which instead rejected the possibility that
Witherspoon had held that highly scrupled jurors are not a cognizable group
during the guilt determination phase of the trial on the basis of the number of
highly scrupled jurors in the population. The court noted that the excluded
jurors constituted 16% of the population, "which is larger than another identi-
fiable group which the Court has stated may not be excluded."'32 Although the
court's finding of cognizability may be correct its reasoning is unsound.33
The Grigsby court identified another basis for finding that a death-quali-
fied jury violates the cross-section requirement even if highly scrupled jurors
are not recognized as a cognizable group. The exclusion of highly scrupled
jurors results in the disproportionate exclusion of other groups already recog-
nized as cognizable: the poor, women, blacks, ethnic and religious groups,
Democrats, and laborers.34 It is settled that if the effect of an otherwise valid
exclusion is to exclude a cognizable group, then the cross-section requirement
is violated.35
The Grigsby court readily found that the remaining two elements of the
Duren test were satisfied by defendant's claim. The second prong of the
32. Id. at 1383. The "other group" referred to is the black population, which constitutes 10%
of the general population. Anotherpossible reading of this portion of Grigsby is that the court was
not using the size of the group to refute the Witherspoon argument, but was leaving the question of
cognizability open. Under either reading, the court could have provided a stronger analysis.
33. While the Taylor decision identified size as one factor in determining cognizability, 419
U.S. at 531, it is not a factor that is related to the distinctiveness of a group's views. The size of a
group does not preclude a finding that its views are adequately represented on the jury by another
group.
It was unnecessary for the Gkigsby court to base its analysis of Wilherspoon on such a weak
argument. Since the court ostensibly was re-examining Witherspoon in light of Taylor, it should
have adopted the reasoning used by the Court in Taylor when it determined that women repre-
sented a cognizable group. In Taylor there was no showing of concrete differences between the
sexes, nor was there any need to assume that women would act as a class. 419 U.S. at 53 1. Rather,
the Court was satisfied that a "subtle interplay of influence", id., existed with women in the jury
room, though it was among the "imponderables." Id. at 531-32. Reliance on intangible differ-
ences would seem particularly persuasive in the case of highly scrupled jurors, since they are
defined by their beliefs in an important aspect of the criminal justice system--that is, their beliefs
about sentencing.
Justice Douglas did advance this argument in Witherspoon, stating:
We can as easily assume that the absence of those opposed to capital punishment would
rob the jury of certain peculiar qualities of human nature as would the exclusion of
women from juries ... we must proceed on the assumption that in many, if not most,
cases of class exclusion on the basis of beliefs or attitudes some prejudice does re-
sult . ..
391 U.S. at 531 (Douglas, J., concurring).
34. 483 F. Supp. at 1384. See the studies cited by the court and an additional study indicat-
ing that death-qualified juries are disproportionately white and male. H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON
JUROR ATTITUDES TowARDs CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 12 (1968).
35. Labat v. Bennet, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966).
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Duren test requires that representation of the excluded group in venires is "not
fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the commu-
nity."' 3 6 The court held that the consistent and total exclusion of a group con-
stituting 16% of the population is clearly neither fair nor reasonable.37 The
final element of a prima facie case of a cross-section violation requires that the
exclusion be "systematic," meaning that the cause of the exclusion is "inherent
in the particular jury-selection process." 38 Several prior decisions had argued
that a defendant's right to representation of a cross-section of the community
ended with the selection of the jury pool, so that any skewing of the represen-
tative nature of the jury that occurred during voir dire was immaterial.39 The
Grigsby court apparently rejected this argument and found that the exclusion
of highly scrupled jurors presented the required systematic exclusion.40
After thus presenting a persuasive argument that highly scrupled jurors
previously excluded under Witherspoon should be recognized as an identifi-
able group in the community, the Grigsby court retreated from this position.
Although sympathetic to defendant's claim the court apparently agreed with
Judge Learned Hand's comment that it is not "desirable for a lower court to
embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be
in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant."41 Accordingly the court
bowed to the precedent of Witherspoon and the possible argument that mildly
scrupled jurors and highly scrupled jurors are not distinct when it comes to
guilt determination.42 While the court was aware that Witherspoon was am-
biguous precedent at best and that the Supreme Court might decide the ques-
tion differently in light of Taylor and Duren,43 it was nonetheless unwilling to
extend the protection offered defendant by Witherspoon. By denying relief on
the cross-section claim the court avoided facing what will become a major
issue if and when highly scrupled jurors are recognized as cognizable, which is
36. 439 U.S. at 364.
37. 483 F. Supp. at 1383. It is at this point that the comparison with the exclusion of blacks is
useful, and it is possible that was all that Grigsby intended. The court seems to be reading a
balancing test of the state's interest into this element when it states that on "the basis of a qualifi-
cation relevant only to sentence determination a group. . . is totally excluded from guilt determi-
nation. It is difficult to see how such lack of representation could be considered fair or
reasonable." Id. A proper application of the Duren test does not consider the state's interests
until the degree of underrepresentation has been shown to be unfair. 439 U.S. at 365-66.
38. 439 U.S. at 366.
39. Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967). The court, citing Tuberville v.
United States, 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962) and United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.
1954), states that "[iut is well pointed out, in either or both of those opinions, that 'the point at
which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the names are put in
the box from which the panels are drawn."' 372 F.2d at 725. But see Crawford v. Bounds, 395
F.2d 297 (4th Cir.), vacated, 393 U.S. 76 (1968). "Where inevitably such jurors will be excused
from petit jury service, it is no answer to say that petitioner's rights were not violated because they
were members of the array from which the jury to try him was chosen." Id. at 307 n.12.
40. 483 F. Supp. at 1383.
41. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., dissent-
ing).
42. 483 F. Supp. at 1384-85.
43. Id. at 1385.
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whether the state's interest in excluding highly scrupled jurors is sufficient to
outweigh defendant's right to a representative jury.
Because the court in Grigsby did not find that the exclusion of jurors un-
der Witherspoon violated the cross-section requirement, it dealt only briefly
with the interests of the state that are advanced by excluding highly scrupled
jurors from the guilt determination phase of the trial. It recognized that the
state has a significant interest in excluding these jurors from the sentencing
phase of a trial, but it was convinced that this interest does not extend to the
guilt determination phase if the prospective juror swears to decide the guilt
issue on the basis of the law and the evidence presented at trial.44 The impli-
cation of this is that the state must find an alternative to single jury determina-
tion of both guilt and punishment in capital cases. Whether this threat will
ever become a reality will depend on the relative weight given to the interests
of defendant and the state. The Supreme Court has insisted that the "right to
a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds. '45 The state
must advance a "significant state interest" to justify the exclusion of a cogniza-
ble group.46
The state's interest in excluding scrupled jurors is based on the state's
right to try a case before an impartial jury.47 The state's argument is that
scrupled jurors should be excluded because "a juror who has conscientious
scruples on any subject, which prevent him from standing indifferent between
the government and the accused, and from trying the case according to the law
and the evidence, is not an impartial juror."'43 At the time that this state inter-
est was accepted as valid, however, it was common for a state to inflict the
death penalty automatically whenever a defendant was convicted of a capital
crime. Allowing scrupled jurors to sit during the guilt phase of the trial re-
sulted in juries acquitting guilty men to avoid the harshness of the gallows. 49
The jury's role has been altered drastically since then. Jurors are now permit-
ted to exercise their discretion in determining if death is the proper penalty.50
While several states recognize that this extra flexibility lessens the interest of
the state in excluding jurors with scruples against the death penalty,5 ' the pre-
44. Id See also State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980) (Exum, J., dissenting),
and the discussion of Avery in Comment, Proposals to Balance Interests of/he Defendant and State
in the Selection of Capital Juries. A Witherspoon Qualiflcation, this issue.
45. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 534.
46. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. at 367.
47. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
48. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 298 (1892). In Logan the state was allowed to
challenge for cause jurors with "conscientious scruples in regard to the infliction of the deathpenalty for crime." Id. In this aspect Logan was overruled by Witherspoon. Scrupled jurors are
not limited to capital cases. Persons biased against polygamy laws were properly excluded from
sitting on the trial of a polygamist. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
49. H. ZEISEL, supra note 34, at 2.
50. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 519.
51. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499,60 N.W. 119 (1894). In finding that the state was not
entitled to challenge for cause scrupled jurors the court noted that "it cannot be said that the state
is entitled to have the punishment of death inflicted in every case. The statute authorizes that
punishment, in the discretion of the jury. . . but the state has no right to a trial by jurors who
have no objection against inflicting the death penalty." Id. at 502-03, 60 N.W. at 121. Accord-
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vailing view is still that those jurors absolutely opposed to capital punishment
cannot be impartial on the issue of guilt. 52
In Spinkellink v. Wainwright5 3 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals main-
tained that a highly scrupled juror will hang the jury on the issue of guilt
rather than allow another jury to hang the defendant during the sentencing
phase of the trial.54 Thus, the court argued, even a bifurcated system provid-
ing separate juries on the issues of guilt and sentencing will not remove the
bias brought to the jury by highly scrupled jurors. The Fifth Circuit found
that the interest in preventing hung juries constituted the "weightier reason"'
required to overcome a defendant's right to a jury drawn from a cross-section
of the community.55 The Grigsby court did not consider this argument, but
apparently viewed a dual jury system as a viable solution to the problem.56
The decision in Spinkellink has been criticized for misconstruing the re-
quirements of a constitutionally "neutral" jury.5 7 Spinkellink framed the issue
as whether "persons who are not opposed to capital punishment are psycho-
logically inclined against criminals and [whether] therefore a jury composed of
such persons is not an impartial jury."58 The California Supreme Court in
Hovey v. Superior Court5 9 rejected this, noting that the Supreme Court in
Witherspoon had not been concerned with actual bias on the part of any of
Witherspoon's jurors.60 Hovey regarded the real issue as being whether a
death-qualified jury met the constitutional need for "diffused impartiality."
Under Hovey a "neutral" jury "is one drawn from a pool which reasonably
ingly the prosecution had to rely on peremptory challenges to exclude scrupled jurors. The same
result was reached in South Dakota in State v. Garrington, 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898).
52. See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Puff,
211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954); People v. Sand, 81 Cal. App. 3d 448, 146 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1978); Rhea
v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N.W. 789 (1902).
53. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978).
54. Id. at 595-96. See also People v. Sand, 81 Cal. App. 3d 448, 450, 146 Cal. Rptr. 448, 450
(1978).
55. 578 F.2d at 597. The court was willing to assume arguendo that the excluded jurors
constituted a cognizable group. Not all commentators have agreed with Spinkellink. The peti-
tioner in Witherspoon had urged that "no irreconcilable conffict exists between the rights of the
petitioner and the interests of the state. The dilemma created by the double-issue procedure can
be obviated either by placing the penalty fixing power in the hands of the judge.. . or by adopt-
ing a system of bifurcated trials." Brief for Petitioner at 12, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968). This, of course, does not answer the argument advanced in Spinkellink but simply denies
the major premise of that reasoning, that highly scrupled jurors will acquit to avoid someone else
imposing the death penalty. See also Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on
the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1971).
56. 483 F. Supp. at 1384. The court implied that the defendant's interest in impartial guilt
determination should outweigh the state's interest in impartial sentencing, stating that "if the same
jury decides both guilt and punishment, that jury could not be qualified on Witherspoon grounds
at all, lest the jury for the initial, guilt detexmination phase be defectively representative in viola-
tion of the constitutional guarantee.' Id.
57. In Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d -, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980), the
court stated that the "Fifth Circuit stumbled and missed the real issue in Spinkellink v. Wain-
wright." Id. at -, 616 P.2d at 1309, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 136 n.41.
58. 578 F.2d at 595.
59. Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d -, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980).
60. Id. at--, 616 P.2d at 130, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 137. The court reasoned that if this had been
the real concern in Witherspoon these jurors would be properly excludable in future cases involv-
ing capital crimes on the basis of actual prejudice against the defendant. Id.
1981]
NORTH CAROLINA LAWREVIEW[
mirrors the diversity of experience and relevant viewpoints of those persons in
the community who can fairly and impartially try the case." 61 This "diffused
impartiality" test obviously incorporates the cross-section requirement as a
factor in determining impartiality.
This debate serves to highlight the confusion surrounding the issue of
"impartiality." Regardless of which approach is taken it is clear that a state
may challenge for cause any juror who is actually biased against conviction.
However, if the pool of potential jurors is made up of individuals who claim to
be able to try the case fairly and impartially, the state should bear the burden
of proving that a given class of these jurors is nonetheless partial towards the
defense. This is especially true when granting the requested exclusions will
deprive a defendant of his right to be tried by a representative jury.62
The court in Grigsby did not have the benefit of the analysis presented in
Hovey and viewed defendant's contentions under what it termed a "functional
equivalency" test. 63 Under this standard "the necessary showing is that the
difference in the makeup of such a jury, as compared to a jury selected without
regard to attitudes towards capital punishment for the determination of guilt,
results in the functional difference in the operation of that jury."64 Defend-
ant's contention before the trial court followed this test. Grigsby claimed that
death-qualification produces a jury which is "conviction-prone," meaning that
such a jury is more likely to convict than a non-death-qualified jury in a given
case.
Although the Supreme Court had held in Witherspoon that the evidence
on the partiality of death-qualified juries was insufficient to prove that they
were conviction-prone, 65 defendant insisted that information made available
since 1968 did demonstrate that death-qualified juries were partial on the issue
61. Id.
62. 483 F. Supp. at 1388 n.23. The opinion in Hopey presents a strong argument for the
proposition that a "neutral" jury will serve as a more accurate fact finder.
Diversity enhances the accuracy of a jury's decision making by improving its ability to
recognize and appropriately evaluate evidence. Testimony from the hearing below, as
well as studies in social psychology, help to explain why this is so. Human perception is
selective, influenced by the very beliefs and attitudes which venirepersons bring into the
courtroom. New data which tend to contradict one's beliefs may be quickly "forgotten"
or may not even be perceived in the first place. The members of a homogeneously com-
posed jury are more likely to perceive evidence in a similar fashion. Also, they are more
likely to filter out any evidence inconsistent with their shared attitudes and values. Inso-
far as a jury is composed of members whose attitudes, preconceptions, and experiences
are diverse, the jury is more likely to perceive and remember all the important evidence
and arguments presented at trial.
28 Cal. 3d at--, 616 P.2d at 1312-13, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40. The perceived partiality of death-
qualified juries on the issue of guilt is reflected by the practice of some prosecutors of waiving the
death penalty after a conviction has been obtained. By death-qualifying a jury when there is no
real intention of seeking the death penalty the prosecution hopes to "get a 'better' jury for its
purpose--one that will be more responsive to the prosecution's case on the guilt-innocence issue."
Oberer, Jury Selection, the Death Penalty and Fair Trial, 71 CASE & COM. 3, 5 (Jul.-Aug. 1966).
63. 483 F. Supp. at 1388 n.23.
64. Id.
65. 391 U.S. at 518. The Court left open the possibility that a defendant in the future might
establish that the jury was not impartial. Id. at 520 n.18.
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of guilt, and that they consistently favored the prosecution. 66
Grigsby desired to present the results of several studies made after Wither-
spoon and the testimony of several expert witnesses that supported the conclu-
sion that there is a "positive and consistent relationship between the degree to
which one favors capital punishment and one's readiness to assess guilt."'6 7
The explanation offered for this phenomenon is that "authoritarian personali-
ties are more prone to find guilt, and those who are not against the death
penalty are more authoritarian, generally, than those who oppose it."' 68 After
examining the evidence, the court in Grigsby held that the showing made by
defendant was strong enough to support a finding that death-qualified juries
are conviction-prone, and that the trial court's refusal to allow defendant a
continuance to present the evidence amounted to an abuse of discretion.69
By granting Grigsby a chance to prove that the jury was conviction-prone
the court implicitly accepted the assumption that guilt-proneness can be
equated with partiality. However, because a jury convicts more often than
other juries deciding similar cases does not necessarily prove that it is biased.
In fact, the guilt-prone jury may be closer to the truth in its assessment of the
facts than its more lenient counterparts. Not all courts have been willing to
find that a conviction-prone jury is partial, stating that what the defendant "is
really asserting is the right to have on the jury some who may be prejudiced in
his favor."'70
There may be in fact no juries that are neutral about sending a man to his
death, with the possible exception of a jury composed solely of members of the
community who have no feelings at all.7 ' However, the evidence presented to
the court seems to establish that the reason a death-qualified jury may be con-
viction-prone is not the ability of nonscrupled jurors to see the truth better
than scrupled jurors, but rather juror personality types and the demographic
spread of those jurors opposed to capital punishment. The person who favors
the death penalty or is neutral concerning its infliction, it is argued, will tend
to view the presumption of innocence accorded to the defendant and the stan-
66. 483 F. Supp. at 1386.
67. Id. at 1388. The court considered the following studies: HAMILTON, INDIVIDUAL DIF-
FERENCES IN ASCRIPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY, GUILT AND APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT (1975);
Boehm, Mr. Preudice, Miss Sympathy, and the Authoritarian Personaliy: An Application of Psy-
chological Measuring Techniques to the Problem oJury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 734; Girsch, The
Witherspoon Question: The Social Science and the Evidence, 35 NLADA BRIEFCASE 99 (1978);
Jurow, supra note 55; Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of Juror's Attitudes and
Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 123 (1971).
68. 483 F. Supp. at 1387. "Authoritarian" personality traits include:
conservatism, rigidity, punitiveness (in the sense of being "in complete agreement with
the administration of harsh punishment"), moralism and inability to understand or toler-
ate deviant behaviour, and hostility toward low status persons (persons considered so-
dally inferior, uneducated, etc.). The Authoritarian juror identifies with the
prosecution's effort to punish a deviant, and often lower-class or minority group, defend-
ant.
Jurow, supra note 55, at 570-71 (footnotes omitted).
69. 483 F. Supp. at 1388.
70. Tuberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
71. Jurow, supra note 55, at 588-89.
19811
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
dard of proof demanded of the state less seriously than will his scrupled coun-
terpart.72 Jurors with scruples against the death penalty are also more likely to
accept a plea of insanity.73 These results do not stem from neutrality but from
the "political conservatism, dogmatism, authoritarianism, lack of self-doubt,
and legal attitudes favoring punishment and constituted authority" which
nonscrupled jurors are likely to exhibit.74
If there is no method for selecting a jury truly neutral on the issue of
capital punishment, then the selection system should aim for a broad base in
the community, so that a defendant's right to be tried by a representative jury
will not be sacrificed in pursuit of an unattainable goal. There are a number
of alternatives to the conventional single jury system that can accomodate
both the state's interests and those of the defendant which are discussed else-
where in this issue.75
Regardless of how a state elects to serve the interests of the defendant, the
court in Grigsby clearly indicated that the current system of excluding highly
scrupled jurors from the guilt determination phase of the trial is inconsistent
with the right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the
community. The court's refusal to grant complete relief should not be read as
a determination that these interests are already adequately protected; rather, it
is indicative of the deference the court paid to the Supreme Court's treatment
of the issue. Eventually the Supreme Court will have to clarify its holding in
Witherspoon, and Grigsby v. Mabry should provide a persuasive argument that
the protection now accorded a defendant facing a capital trial does not meet
fundamental constitutional standards.
THOMAS KIERAN MAHER
72. Id. at 595-96.
73. Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of
Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 53, 60-61 (1970).
74. Girsch, supra note 7, at 128. See also Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Repre-
sentativeness ofthe Death-Quailed Jury: A Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,
31(1970).
75. See Comment, Proposals to Balance Interests of the Defendant and State in the Selection of
Capital Juries A Witherspoon Qualification, this issue.
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